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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINCOLN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
d/b/a CHEVY CHASE APARTMENTS, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
DOROTHY S. FERRIER, 
Defendant, 
Cross Claimant, 
and Appellant. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Case No. 14296 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in Unlawful Detainer brought by 
the Respondent against the Appellant wherein the Respondent 
sought to obtain a Judgment in Unlawful Detainer in accordance 
with the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended 1953, together with attorney's fees. 
The Appellant filed an Answer alleging the affirmative 
defense of retaliatory eviction resulting from the Appellant's 
assertion of her constitutional rights provided under Article 1, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Section 1 and 15, of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
and as provided for under the Constitution of the United States 
in the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Counterclaim of the Appellant sets forth allegations 
of the wilful, wanton, and malicious acts of the Respondent 
against the person and property of the Appellant by the Respondent, 
seeking a denial by the Court to Respondent's action in Unlawful 
Detainer, upon the premise of the action being a retaliatory 
eviction because Appellant's assertion of her right to freedom 
of speech and her right to be free from harassment and enjoy 
freedom of association in her chosen place of abode. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted the Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on its action of Unlawful Detainer, awarded 
to the Respondent triple damages for Unlawful Detainer, even 
though there had been a prepayment of rental monies due and 
owing into the Court prior to time of trial, granted attorney 
fees and ordered that the Answer of the Appellant and her 
Counterclaim be stricken as a sham. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and final 
Order of the Lower Court, which denied to the Appellant the 
-2-
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right to a trial and hearing on her Counterclaim, a reversal 
of the Judgment of Unlawful Detainer for triple damages and 
the award of $500.00 attorney's fees granted by the Lower 
Court to the Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant resided with her daughter (R-5A) in 
an apartment complex known as Chevy Chase, wherein the Appellant 
paid $175.00 a month as rental thereon. The Appellant rented 
the premises on December 2, 1974, paying rent in advance plus 
a $50.00 deposit as a security deposit to guarantee compliance 
with all of the terms of a standard Monthly Rental Agreement 
used by apartment complexes generally (R-5A). 
The premises were owned by an absentee financial corpora-
tion under a resident manager named Clarence Johnson. Appellant 
sought to circulate a Petition among the many residents of 
the apartment complex seeking to oust the manager, because 
of the conduct of the Respondent's manager in seeking to prevent 
tenants from conversing with each other, eavesdropping on tenants, 
prevent adult visitors to enter the premises of the Appellant, 
except upon hours set by the management; the committing of 
acts of vandalism as against the premises and property of the 
Appellant, damage to the motor vehicle of the Appellant, and 
-3-
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acts in violation of the sensibility of the Appellant by placing 
objects and materials in the entrance to the premises of the 
Appellant. The Appellant sets forth all of these various acts 
in the Counterclaim of the Appellant (R-9, R-12). 
The Respondent brought an action of Unlawful Detainer 
against the Appellant for the purpose of preventing the Appellant 
from continuing the circulation of Petitions seeking the ouster 
of the manager. (R-10) 
The Appellant filed an Answer and a verified Counterclaim, 
which was subscribed to under oath by the Appellant, which Answer 
and Counterclaim bore the typed signature of Attorney Pete N. 
Vlahos as Attorney for the Counterclaimant, Defendant and Appellant, 
(R-8 through R-12). The Appellant further filed with the Clerk 
of the Court tender of rent by tenant in submitting rent for 
the months of July and August, further setting forth that rent 
monies would continue to be deposited with the Clerk of the 
Court as they became due in accordance with the terms of the 
Rental Agreement for so long as the Counterclaimant would remain 
a tenant on said premise. The tender of rent by tenant was 
subscribed to by the Attorney for the Appellant (R-15). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS ERROR. 
The Court rendered a Judgment in the Respondent's 
-4-
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action in Unlawful Detainer granting a Motion for Summary Judgment 
to the Respondent, together with attorney's fees in the sum 
of $500.00, and costs taxed in the sum of $24.90. 
The Court subscribed to the Findings of Fact and Conclusion 
of Law in its granting of Summary Judgment, alleging that: 
Pursuant to the terms of paragraph three of said 
Rental Agreement and Title 78, Chapter 36, Section 
3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Plaintiff (Respondent) 
caused a notice to quit the said premises***, that kry 
the terms of said Rental Agreement, particularly para-
graph 9 thereof, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover 
its reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein, which 
the Court determines to be $500.00, together with 
Plaintiff's taxable costs incurred herein. (R-26,R-27) 
(Emphasis added) 
This Court held in Forrester vs. Cook, et al, 292 P. 
206, October 11, 1930: 
Although a contract between the parties to the action 
provided for the payment of attorney's fees, other 
costs, and damages for Unlawful Detainer, that an 
action brought for an Unlawful Detainer is not an 
action to enforce an agreement, and that the action 
is summary and limited and is one for recovery of 
possession of property and damages because of the 
unlawful detention. The law and not the contract 
fixes the measure of damages. No provision is made 
in the law for an attorney's fee in this sort of 
action. 
This Court again had reason to reconsider the Forrester 
vs. Cook, et al, supra, decision in the case of Leone vs. Zuniga, 
34 P.2d at page 703, and again reiterated the law as expounded 
in Forrester vs. Cook, stating that the rule as announced is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
controlling and that attorney's fee may not properly be allowed 
in a suit for Unlawful Detainer. 
Upon the Courts award of attorney's fees to the Respondent, 
Counsel for Appellant remonstrated to the Court: 
MR. VLAHOS: Will the Court also entertain my 
submitting to the Court the Utah decision on attorney's 
fees, or does the Court desire that brought at a 
proper proceeding, or will the Court entertain it just 
by submitting the case to you. 
THE COURT: I have awarded him attorney's fees. 
(R-59) 
It is submitted to the Court that there is no previous 
basis for the award of attorney's fee in an action of Unlawful 
Detainer as established by the law of this State or the decisions 
of this Court and also by the Courts of the State of California 
from which this Court acknowledged in the Forrester vs. Cook 
case, that the exact Statute of Unlawful Detainer was taken. 
POINT II 
TRIPLE DAMAGE SHOULD NOT BE ARBITRARILY AWARDED. 
The Appellant was not delinquent in rent at the time 
of the giving of notice of termination of tenancy. The notice 
that was given on June 10, 1975, advised the Appellant that the 
occupancy of the Appellant would be terminated as of June 30, 
but did not set forth in the legal notice the year, only the 
-6-
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month and day for the termination of the tenancy; was not given 
for delinquency of rent; but for reasons which the Appellant 
has alleged in her Counterclaim and will be subsequently set 
forth herein in this Brief to the Court. (R-5A) 
The Appellant at the time of filing an Answer and a 
Counterclaim alleged that rent had been tendered on July 1/ 
1975, and was refused by the Respondent, and further, that upon 
the filing of the Complaint, a tender of rent was made by the 
tenant paying rent for the months of July and August in the 
amount of $350.00 to the Clerk of the Court by a Cashiers Check. 
The check was made payable to Dorothy Ferrier and endorsed in 
blank by her and deposited with the Clerk of the District Court. 
The tender further set forth that rent monies would continue 
to be deposited with the Clerk of the Court as same shall become 
due, in accordance with the terms of the Rental Agreement, for 
so long as the Counterclaimant shall remain a tenant on said 
premises. (R-15) 
In Cole vs. Cole, 122 P.2d 201, 101 Ut. 355, the Court 
stated: 
Generally where a tender is made which, if accepted, 
is intended to operate as payment of the debt, the 
tender, if rejected, must be kept good, which is 
ordinarily done by bringing or depositing the money 
into Court, since in case the tender is by check, 
the check is not payment unless expressly accepted 
as such. 
In Hepburn & Dundas vs. Auld, 5 U.S. 321, the Court 
-7-
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stated: 
Tender and refusal are equal to performance by 
party making tender. 
A tender of rent having been made on July 1 and August 1, 
and the funds for the months of July and August for the monthly 
rent of $175.00 having been paid into the Court, the loss or 
damages to the Respondent were a nullity, in that the Respondent 
could have collected rents for July and August when tendered. 
The Court has indicated in the Forrester vs. Cook case, supra, 
that the provision for damages in three times the amount of 
damages is highly penal and, therefore, is subject to strict 
construction. The Court stated that damages only may be trebled, 
and there has been no claim for waste to the premises, nor any 
other damages and there could have been no damages assessed by 
the Court by virtue of the tender of payment for July and August 
by the Appellant to the Respondent and the paying into the Court 
at time of suit of the monies due and owing for rent, and therefore, 
the Court erred in awarding triple the amount of rent proferred 
and refused by the Respondent. 
The Court is advised that there was no discovery of any 
kind made in this action and that the filing of a Complaint and 
the filing of a verified Answer and Counterclaim is the only 
quality of evidence that was before the Court when the Court 
-8-
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awarded in addition to the July and August rental monies allegedly 
due for rent to September 10, which the Court tripled by its 
award. 
The attention of the Court is called to the "testimony" 
of Counsel for the Respondent when he represented to the Court, 
that the tenant (Appellant) occupied the premises until 
September 10* Counsel alleges as a basis for his allegation, 
that the premises were not vacated until September 10 alleging 
as a basis that the keys have not allegedly been returned to 
the apartment manager, and further stated: 
But we want the keys back. We want to be sure 
that we arn't set-up by going in there and finding 
some small items she has left behind. (R-64) 
The Attorney for the Appellant stated to the Court 
that the Appellant "called me on the phone, that she was out last 
weekend". (R-47) The Counsel for the Appellant further testified, 
"My client in a phone call advised me that she notified the 
manager". (R-54) 
Based upon the statements by both Counsel, the Court 
stated: 
The Plaintiff is entitled to the Writ of Restitution 
and Judgment for the rent for July, August, and 
the first ten days of September. (R-54) 
It is submitted to the Court that the testimony of 
neither Counsel is sufficient upon which to base a judgment as 
-9-
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an evidenciary fact as to when the premises were actually returned 
to the Respondent. 
It was held in Pacific States Auxiliary Corporation 
vs. Farris, 5 P.2d 452, District Court of Appeals, California/ 
November/ 1931: 
That such a determination may rest only upon legal 
evidence. 
This principle of law was also set forth in Maher vs. 
Wilson/ 139 Cal. 514, 73 P. 418, and in 26 CJ 862/ wherein it 
states: 
The power to fix the damages, compensatory or nominal/ 
rests with the Trier of the Facts, but that body may 
rest its determination on legal evidence only. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that there is 
no evidence whatsoever that is acceptable, that the return of the 
keys to the apartment was the first requisite to vacating the 
apartment, and secondly, that the testimony of either of the 
Counsel herein is an acceptable determination of the date of 
vacating of the premises, where both Counsel make opposite represen-
tations, and the representation made by Counsel for the Respondent, 
which is a declaration against the interest of the Respondent, 
states that the keys had not yet been returned and that was the 
basis of the allegation of continued occupancy of the apartment. 
(R-64) 
-10-
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POINT III 
THE SUBMISSION OF AN ANSWER AND A VERIFIED COUNTERCLAIM 
BY THE APPELLANT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SHAM PLEADING. 
The Court granted a Motion to strike the Answer and 
Counterclaim of the Appellant on the basis that the verified 
pleading of the Appellant, without the signature of the attorney 
thereto, constituted a sham pleading. (R-24) At the time that 
the attorney submitted the Answer and Counterclaim, which were 
verified and signed under oath by the Appellant, the attorney 
signed a pleading of a "Tender of Rent by Tenant" (R-15), and 
further, the attorney's typed block appeared on the face of the 
Answer and Counterclaim as Attorney for the Appellant. 
This Court held in West Mountain Lime & Stone Company 
vs. Danley, 111 P. 647, that the requirement of the Code, requiring 
that the Complaint be subscribed by the party or his attorney, 
is sufficiently complied with if the Complaint is verified and 
such verification is signed and the authority cited is Harrison 
vs. Wright, 1 N.Y. St.P. 736; Barrett vs. Joslynn, 9 Misc. Reports 
407, 29 N.Y.Supp. 1070; Railway vs. Bailey, 70 Oh. St. 88, 70. 
N.E. 900; State vs. Chadwick, 10 Ore. 423. 
The Court further held: 
In any event, such a defect must be objected to 
timely and specifically or it will be deemed waived. 
If such an objection is made, however, the Court 
will always permit the party to cure the defect 
-11-
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by subscribing the Complaint. (Emphasis added) 
The record shows that the Attorney for the Appellant 
repeatedly offered to subscribe to the Complaint, if the Court 
deemed it to be necessary, at the time of the hearing on the 
Motion to Strike (R-47), and further cited to the Court the West 
Mountain Lime & Stone Company vs. Danley, supra, as authority 
to the Court. (R-47, R-50) 
Counsel for Respondent stated to the Court, that if 
a party to an action can answer to a Complaint or sign a Counter-
claim: 
Then we are in a spot as far as judiciary and the 
legal system goes, because from henceforth on, 
any layman can practice law without a license to 
practice before the Supreme Court of Utah. 
It is submitted to this Court, that the case here was 
before the District Court, not before the Supreme Court, and 
secondly, that it has been known for parties who are Defendants 
in an action to file their own Answer and even at times to file 
a Counterclaim, let alone a verified pleading. 
The chaotic condition predicted for Utah if such were 
the case is not supported by the law of the State of California, 
wherein it is set forth in Title 6, Section 446, of the California 
Code under Verification of Pleadings: 
Every pleading (except in Justice Courts when 
the pleadings are oral) shall be subscribed by 
the party or his attorney. (Emphasis added) 
-12-
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The California Code further provides: 
Where a pleading is verified, it shall be by the 
Affidavit of a party, unless the parties are absent 
from the County where the attorney has his office, 
or from some cause unable to verify it, or the facts 
are within the knowledge of his attorney or other 
persons verifying the same. When the pleading is 
verified by the attorney, or any other person except 
one of the parties, he shall set forth in the Affidavit 
the reason why it is not made by one of the parties. 
It is submitted to the Court that the State of California 
is not in a chaotic condition because of this Rule. 
It is further submitted to this Court, that reference 
to the West Mountain Lime & Stone Company vs. Danley was made 
in the case of Christensen vs. Johnson, 61 P.2d 597, (1936), 
this Court stated that the law as announced in the West Mountain 
Lime & Stone Company case is in accord with the references made 
in Corpus Juris. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under Rule 11 provide 
the identical language as in the Utah Rule, and it has been held 
in a number of cases, that: 
The final disposition of a suit, as by dismissal 
of the action for Plaintiff's failure to comply 
with Rule 11 or the entry of a Judgment by Default . ^ 
against the Defendant for his noncompliance, is 
an ultimate sanction provided by the terms of the 
Rule, but which naturally should be invoked rarely, 
and certainly not for minor infractions. 
Bareco Oil Company vs. Alexander, Northern District, 
Iowa, 1940, 33 F.Supp. 32; Universal Laboratories, Inc., vs. 
-13-
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Vivaudou, Inc./ Southern District of New York, 1944, 8 Fr.Serv. 
11.51. 
In Harris vs. Municipal Court of City and County of 
Denver, et al, 134 P.2d 1055, Supreme Court of Colorado, May, 
1951, was an action for violation in the Municipal Court of the 
City and County of Denver for violation of a municipal ordinance 
and was a civil proceedings instituted in a Court not of record, 
and the proceedings therein were governed by the laws and rules 
pertaining to civil procedure. There was a failure to sign the 
Complaint charging violation and the Court held: 
There is no proof of wilful failure or refusal and 
no prejudice could be claimed by the Defendants if 
the Plaintiff were given leave to sign the pleading 
heretofore served. 
In Holley Coal Company vs. Globe Indemnity Company, 
4th Cir., 186 F.2d 291, the Court said: 
That an unsigned pleading is not invalid. 
In DeMontis vs. Potomac Electric Company, D.C. 1 F.R.D. 
119, the Court stated: 
If, then, we are to follow our repeatedly declared 
rule, that this is a civil action, governed by 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, we must hold that 
the failure to sign the Complaint was not jurisdic-
tional, but is subject to correction upon being 
called to the attention of the Court. 
It is, therefore, submitted to the Court, that the filing 
of the verified pleading by the Appellant and the continued offer 
-14-
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of Counsel to the Court of the willingness to subscribe to the 
pleadings if the Court deemed it necessary was not such a pleading 
as to constitute a sham pleading resulting in the striking of 
both the Answer and the Counterclaim of the Appellant, specifi-
cally in light of the fact that the Court itself found: 
Well, I think the situation is that a person may 
represent himself, I don't think there is any question 
about that. But I think when he has Counsel, Counsel 
has to sign the pleadings. Now whether or not that's 
cured of it at this late date or not, I don't know. 
I believe, though, that there are paragraphs in the 
Counterclaim which may state a cause of action. (R-58) 
POINT IV 
RETALIATORY EVICTION IS A VALID DEFENSE IN AN ACTION 
OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
This doctrine comes into focus in the instant matter 
before the Court as set forth in the Counterclaim of the Appellant 
herein, wherein the facts as have been previously stated show, 
that the tenant resided with her daughter in the Chevy Chase 
Apartments (R-8, -9), a large non-slum apartment complex (R-4,-6), 
and even though not delinquent in rent was served with a Notice 
of Unlawful Detainer (R-5), and as set forth in the Counterclaim 
of the Appellant (R-9), alleges that the Appellant was being 
evicted from the premises because of her refusal to allow the 
manager of the apartment house to infringe upon her First Amendment 
-15-
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rights of freedom of speech in circulating a Petition among other 
tenants of the apartment complex; seeking removal of the manager 
as resulting from the constant harassment of the manager; by 
eavesdropping; preventing adult visitors to enter upon the premises 
of the Counterclaimant (the Appellant), except at hours set by 
the Respondent; and that the Respondent caused acts of vandalism 
to occur as against the premises and property of the appellant; 
and by acts in violation of the sensibility of the Appellant 
by placing objects and materials on the entrance to the premises 
of the Counterclaimant. 
Inasmuch as the Rules of Pleading under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure require merely a basic setting forth of elements 
of a case, the development of the exact type, quality, and quantity 
of the interference by the Respondent with the life and the right 
of the Appellant to live peacefully in her own home and have the 
freedoms that one would expect from residing in a non-slum apartment 
unit paying $175.00 a month for rent, would have been developed by 
Discovery and trial. 
The Appellant further alleged that the conduct of the 
Respondent was malicious, wanton, and wilful, and done for the 
purpose of harassing and intimidating the Appellant, and that 
as a direct and proximate result of the wilful, wanton, and malicious 
acts of the Respondent, the Appellant suffered mental anguish 
and anxiety, and feared for the safety of herself and her minor 
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child, and that the conduct of the Respondent was outrageous, 
intolerable, and in violation of the standards of the community 
by reason of the aforesaid conduct. 
While a large number of the newly developed cases 
generally evolve around the objection of tenants to the habita-
bility of the premises, or the overcharging of rents, and are 
actionable generally for those specific reasons, by reason of 
specific statutes, there is a large body of cases developing 
and already adjudicated which evolve around the violation of 
the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and constitutional 
rights of the individual, and in the State of Utah, would evolve 
around and about the same rights guaranteed under the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, which are parallel to these Amendments 
to the United States Constitution. 
It is the position of the Appellant, that the action 
for Unlawful Detainer herein sought under a statute enacted by 
the State is a right not found at Common Law, namely the act 
of Unlawful Detainer, amounts to State action which abridges 
the Appellant's right of freedom of speech and assembly and the 
right to petition the government for redress of grievances, all 
of which are protected by the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and by the comparable Utah constitutional provision. 
Edwards vs. Habib, United States Court of Appeals, 397 
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F.2d 687, 1968, with Cert, denied by United States Supreme Court 
at 393 U.S. 1016. This was an action by a landlord for possession 
of the dwelling house rented on a month-to-month lease. A Judgment 
of the Lower Court in favor of the landlord was reversed in the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, where the Court held that while the 
landlord might evict for any legal reason or for no reason at all, 
that he was not free to evict a tenant in retaliation for tenant's 
report of housing code violations to the authorities. 
The defense of retaliatory eviction to a summary proceed-
ing, such as an action of Unlawful Detainer, was not available 
at Common Law, but neither was an action of Unlawful Detainer, 
which is strictly a statutory law enacted by this State, and as 
the Court has also ruled, such a law must be strictly interpreted 
and followed as stated in Forrester vs. Cook, supra. 
The State of Utah has adopted the Common Law, but the 
judiciary, if not kept abreast of the needs and requirements of 
the changing times and conditions, will indeed be out of step 
with the modern concept of the relation of individuals and insti-
tutions to each other. 
In Gallagher vs. St. Raymonds R. C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 
554, the Court stated: 
We recognize that the Common Law of this State 
is not an anachronism, but is a living law which 
responds to the surging reality of changed conditions. 
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At Common Law, the only legal remedy available to a 
landlord was an action in ejectment, which was a drawn out and 
expensive proceeding, which enabled the landlord to regain his 
property, and the enactment of an action of Unlawful Detainer 
was to enable the landlord to so regain his property quickly 
and inexpensively. 
It was held in Flewwellin vs. Lent, 91 App.Div. 430, 
(New York State) the Court held that because summary eviction 
proceeding is in derogation of the Common Law, it must be strictly 
construed against the landlord. 
It is, therefore, seen that the essence of the defenses 
available to a tenant is the right to possession of the demised 
premises and that the defense of retaliatory eviction is not 
based on the tenant's right to possession, per se, but rather 
seeks to deny possession to the landlord because of his tainted 
motive in evicting the tenant. 
Several States have adopted legislation, recognize 
the retaliatory eviction as a defense, and they are California, 
Illinois, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Maine, and Minnesota. Prior 
to the adoption of the legislation in California, it was held 
in Schweiger vs. Superior Court of Alameda County, 90 Cal.Reptr. 
729, 476 P.2d 97, (Nov., 1970): 
The judicial recognition of the defense of retalia-
tory eviction has been well documented in a number 
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of cases/ which will be cited herein, and include 
Edwards vs, Habib, supra; Dickhut vs. Norton, 
45 Wis.2d 389. 
The Court further stated in Schweiger, supra: 
If we deny the tenants defense against retaliatory 
eviction in an action for Unlawful Detainer, we 
lend the exercise of judicial process to aid landlords 
in punishing tenants with the audacity to exercise 
their statutory rights. 
Thomas Oil, Inc. vs. Onsgaard, 215 N.W.2d 793, (1974), 
states: 
Defendant made a claim, that a corporation is 
a corporation for the purposes of Fourteenth Amendment 
and that judicial action may be "State action" 
for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
further stated: "No State shall ** deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws". 
Frampton vs. Central Indiana Gas Company, 297 N.E.2d 
425, Indiana, 1973. This was an action for retaliatory discharge 
to an employee for filing a Workmens Compensation Complaint 
and the Court held that such conduct is wrongful, and an unconscion 
able act, and is actionable in a Court of law. The Court further 
held that generally an employee at will may be discharged without 
cause, but there is an exception when the employee is discharged 
solely for exercising a statutory right. And the Court stated: 
In order for the goals of Workmens Compensation Act to be realized 
and for public policy to be effectuated, the employee must be 
able to exercise his right in an unfettered fashion without being 
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subject to reprisal. If employers are permitted to penalize 
employees for filing Workmens Compensation Claims, a most important 
public policy will be undermined. The fear of being discharged 
would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory 
right. Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensa-
tion - opting, instead, to continue their employment without 
incident. The end result is that the employer is effectively 
relieved of his obligation under the Workmens Compensation Act. 
The Court further stated that this holding was analogous to a 
dispossession of a tenant for retaliatory eviction in reporting 
code violations to a public agency as set forth in Edwards vs. 
Habib, supra. 
In Aweeka vs. Bonds, 20 Cal.App.3rd 278, 97 Cal.Rpt. 
650, (1971), it was stated that a landlord's retaliatory eviction 
is the basis of an affirmative cause of action. 
In E&E Newman, Inc. vs. Hallock, 281 Atlantic Reporter 
2d 544, Superior Court of New Jersey, (1971)., the landlord 
sued the tenant for possession on the basis of nonpayment of 
rent. The tenant was active in seeking improvements in the 
apartment which he rented, and registered a Complaint with the 
Board of Health and Plumbing Inspector, and also sought the 
help of a voluntary organization whose purpose was to aid people 
with tenancy and welfare problems. 
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The landlord gave the tenant notice of increase of 
rent from $70,00 to $200.00 a month, even though the other nine 
tenants in the building did not receive such a notice. 
An action to evict for nonpayment of rent was brought 
by the landlord against the tenant. 
Subsequent to the occurrence of the action, the State 
enacted a statute for the protection of tenants in comparable 
situations and the Court could not invoke the statute, but the 
Court did find that the eviction by the landlord was a reprisal 
for the conduct of the tenant, and the Court stated: 
That a landlord should not be permitted to evict 
a tenant or to raise his rent, as a reprisal for 
the tenant's exercise of a constitutionally protected 
right. 
The Court quoted from the case of Engler vs. Capital 
Management Corporation, 112 N.J. Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615, (1970), 
wherein the Court reasoned that to countenance such retaliation 
would be to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, in that the tenant's 
right to freedom of speech and assembly would be unduly impaired. 
In Engler vs. Capital Management Corporation, supra, 
the tenant brought suit for injunction to restrain the landlord 
from refusing to renew leases at the expiration of their respective 
terms. The basis of the landlord's action being to refuse to 
renew tenant's leases because of tenant's activities in connection 
with a tenant's association. The Court held that an essential 
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purpose of any tenant's association must be to safeguard its 
members by reporting, if necessary, pressing complaints to remedy 
housing conditions which impair their health and safety. Such 
a purpose and the initiative to carry it out are constitutionally 
protected within freedom of speech and in furtherance of the 
legislative objectives and health codes, building codes, and 
related legislation. 
In Hosey vs. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F.Supp. 501, (S.D.N.Y. 
1969), the Court stated: 
An eviction ordered by a State Court in an action 
begun to retaliate against a tenant for exercising 
his rights of speech and assembly, to remedy building 
and health code violations in his building would 
be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The conflict between property and civil rights arose 
in the case of Marsh vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 Sup.Ct. 276 
(1946), wherein the question presented was whether a State can 
impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute 
religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town 
contrary to the wishes of management. Justice Black in writing 
the decision for the Supreme Court made the following statement 
at page 509, wherein he stated: 
When we balance the constitutional rights of owners 
of property against those of the people to enjoy 
freedom of press and religion, as we must here, 
we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy 
a preferred position. As we have stated before, 
the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by 
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the First Amendment "lies at the foundation of 
free government by free men", and we must in all 
cases "waive the circumstances and *** appraise 
the * reasons * in support of the regulation * of 
the rights". Schneider vs. State, 308 U.S. 147, 
161, 60 Sup.Ct. 146. In our view, the circum-
stances, that the property rights to the premises 
for the deprivation of liberty, here involved, 
took place, were held by others than the public, 
is not sufficient to justify the States permitting 
a corporation to govern a community of citizens 
so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and 
the enforcement of such restraint by the applica-
tion of a State statute. 
In Edwards vs. Habib, the Court restated the thoughts 
of Justice Black as set forth in the Marsh vs. State of Alabama, 
supra, case. 
In McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions, Landlords and 
Tenants Reform, 29 Md. Law Review 193, (1969), the author stated: 
Even though perpetual tenancies would not result, 
it is plain that prohibiting retaliatory eviction 
limits the landlord freedom to deal with his property 
as he chooses. The same may be said of zoning 
regulations, building codes, health and safety 
laws, or 60-day wait to evict a tenant who is not 
in default, and many other rules. Completely un-
fettered property has probably always been a myth. 
So long as the invasion of a landlord's property 
rights is moderate, only carried to the extent 
reasonably necessary to give effect to the competing 
legitimate interest of tenants, there should be 
no doubt of its constitutionality. In this respect, 
a Judge made prohibition against retaliatory eviction 
is no more an invasion of a landlord's interest 
than is a statute. 
It is submitted that retaliatory eviction can be classified 
as "State action" if the analogy of some leading cases already 
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well established are considered. 
In the leading case of Shelley vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 
1, 68 Sup.Ct. 836, there was a judicial enforcement of the Private 
Property Agreement containing a racially restrictive covenant, 
and the Court found it to be State action in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though 
no Statute was involved. 
In New York Times Company vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
84 Sup.Ct. 710, (1964), the Supreme Court held that a newspaper's 
First Amendment rights were abridged by the State Court's award 
of a libel Judgment against it. Despite the fact, that the suit 
was one between private individuals, the United States Supreme 
Court found that the action of the Alabama Court, in finding 
the Times liable in damages for libeling the public figure was 
State action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court, in this case, stating: 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private 
parties, the Alabama Courts have applied a State 
Rule of Law which petitioners claim to oppose 
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms 
of speech and press. It matters not that that 
law has been applied in a civil action and that it 
is Common Law only, though supplemented by Statute. 
The test is not the form in which State power 
has been applied, but whatever the form, whether 
such power has in fact been exercised***. 
In Abstract Investment Company vs. Hutchinson, 204 C.A.2d 
242, an action brought against the Defendant, who was occupying 
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the premises under a month-to-month tenancy, and the Defendant 
was served by the Plaintiff-landlord with a notice to quit, follow-
ing which the Plaintiff brought an Unlawful Detainer proceedings. 
The attention of the Court is called to the fact, that the California 
Statute in Unlawful Detainer is the identical statute of Utah, 
in that Utah adopted the California Statute for its own as this 
Court stated in Forrester vs. Cook, supra. 
The defense of the Defendant was that his tenancy was 
being terminated solely because he was a negro, which the Trial 
Court refused to admit into evidence and which the Appellate 
Court reversed, holding that the Plaintiff was seeking State 
judicial action to evict the Defendant because of his race, and 
that under the Shelley case, supra, such action is contrary to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court has power to look beyond 
the allegations of the Complaint to inquire into the constitutional 
issue, and further, that in an Unlawful Detainer proceedings, 
no challenge as to title or Cross Complaint are permitted, but 
equitable defenses have been allowed, and the defense of unconsti-
tutional discrimination is permissible wherein the Court quoted 
from 204 Cal.App.2d 249, and stating: 
His defense is a constitutional defense based upon 
a broad equitable principle. Certainly the interest 
in preserving the summary nature of an action cannot 
out-weigh the interest of doing substantial justice. 
In the instant matter before the Court can we state 
that a person residing in a non-slum complex and seeks merely 
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to assert constitutional rights of free speech, to be free from 
harassment and protected by the Due Process Clause of the Utah 
and United States Constitution, and who is not a minority person, 
has any less rights merely because of that fact. 
The relative position of the landlord and tenant was 
set forth in the observation made by the Court in the case of 
Schweiger vs. Superior Court of Alameda County, supra, wherein 
the Court summarized its relationship by stating: 
Few Appellate Courts in the United States have 
considered the availability of a defense against 
retaliatory eviction. As in many aspects of 
landlord-tenant law, Appellant precedent is sparse 
because of the economic factor; the tenants involved 
are often unable to afford Appeals or are without 
direct appellate access in the cases arising in 
Small Claims Courts. 
The attitude of the Courts towards an action of Unlawful 
Detainer was summarized by the Court in Knight vs. Black, 19 
Cal.App. 518, 126 P. 512, wherein the Court speaking of the 
remedy of Unlawful Detainer, said: 
***A1though the remedy provided by the law *** 
is summary in principle and process, nevertheless 
the very nature of the action, involving, as it 
does, a forefeiture, appeals to the equity side 
of the Court, and in turn requires "a full examina-
tion of all of the equities involved to the end 
that exact justice be done. 
In the instant matter before this Court, it is submitted 
that the right of the Appellant herein, wherein the Appellant 
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sought no economic benefit by her assertion of a right to continued 
tenancy under the facts of attempted eviction for exercise of 
Appellant's rights of free speech by a revengeful landlord and 
wherein the good faith of the Appellant was evidenced by payment 
into Court and tender at all times of all funds due to the landlord, 
with no demand being made for any claim of non-habitability of 
premises, but premised and based only on the Appellant's exercise 
of the right of full citizenship, should not be considered and 
deemed so inconsequential as to vest her with any less right 
to "substantial justice" as was decreed by the Court in the case 
of Abstract Investment Company vs. Hutchinson, 204 Cal.App.2d 
242, 22 Cal.Rptr. 309, (1962), and that the Appellant had the 
same right not to be deprived of home and shelter because of 
her exercise of her constitutional right to petition, which is 
such a broad equitable principle as is deserving of protection, 
by reason of the constitutional safeguards provided for in Article 
I, Sections 1 and 15, of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
and in the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the 
Lower Court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the Respondent 
in an action of Unlawful Detainer; that the good faith tender 
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of monthly rent by the Appellant to the Respondent and the 
refusal of the Respondent to accept the rent; and the payment 
by the Appellant into Court of the rental tendered, together 
with the Appellant's reasonable belief, that her eviction could 
not be enforced where the only basis of the attempted eviction 
was the Appellant's exercise of her constitutional rights, did 
not warrant the legal imposition of triple damages. 
The finding by the Court, without any legal evidence 
available to the Court, that the Appellant was in occupancy of 
the premises from September 1 to September 10, together with a 
triple penalty for such period, was not a proper Finding of Fact, 
The striking of the Answer of the Appellant and the 
Counterclaim as a sham pleadings by the Court, without accepting 
the offer of Appellant's Counsel to subscribe to the pleadings, 
was an abuse of discretion of the Court, 
It is further submitted, that while a landlord may evict 
for any cause, that an eviction which is revengeful and is a 
retaliatory eviction, is in violation of the constitutional rights 
of the tenant, namely the Appellant herein, and that the Judgment 
of the Lower Court should be reversed, reinstating the Answer 
and Counterclaim of the Appellant, together with a finding by 
this Court of the right of the Appellant to assert her allegations 
of a constitutional defense as against an action of Unlawful 
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Detainer, and the rights of the Appellant to Counterclaim or 
a separate cause of action to adjudicate allegations of the 
Appellant's injuries allegedly inflicted by the Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted/ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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